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Die doe/ van hierdie artikel is om die 
institusionele en finansie1e veranderinge 
wat meegebring is deur die herf ormulering 
van die beleid vir industriele desentralisasie 
te boekstaaf - veral sedert die stigting van 
die ontwikkelingsbank van Suidelike Afrika 
(OBSA). Dit is veral die impak wat hierdie 
veranderinge op die private sektor het so-
In a sense this paper provides a 'how to' 
of industrial decentralisation (ID)- the in­
stitutions which should be approached 
by companies interested in ID, and the 
interrelationships among these institu­
tions. The goal of this paper, however, is 
broader. It is to chronicle the institutional 
and financial changes which have been 
brought. about by the reformulation of 
ID policy, and especially by the form­
ation of the Development Bank of South­
ern Africa (DBSA). Our object is to con­
sider the implications of these changes. 
We are concerned both with the impact 
of the cha'!ges on the private sector, and 
also with thl'; extent to which they will 
contribute to the attainment of the objec­
tives of Goverment policy. 
The paper consists of four sections. The 
.first section contains a brief introduction 
to the political-economic framework of 
the ID policy. In the second we provide 
an overview of the institutional and finan­
cial arrangements circa 1981. The over­
view provides a basis both for tracing 
the changes which have occurred, and 
for suggesting why they were thought neces­
sary. The final section contains our prog-
also indebted to the Development Cor­
porations of the homelands for the finan­
cial statements mailed to them. Needless 
to say, the opinions expressed herein are 
those of the authors and should not be 
taken as reflections on the views of any 
officials within the above bodies. We 
we/ as die mate waartoe die veranderinge 
sol bydra tot die bereiking van die doel­
witte van Regeringsbeleid wat besondere 
aandag kry. 
Die artikel bestaan uit vier dele. Die eerste 
dee/ beskryf kortliks die polities-ekono­
miese raamwerk van die beleid vir indus­
triele desentralisasie. In die tweede dee/ 
nostications for the future of ID policy, 
especially as it affects the private sector. 
A Political-Economic Introduction 
Few people question that the motive of 
the ID policy in South Africa is political. 
The government has argued that the social 
costs of more rapid urbanization exceed 
the private benefits to recent migrants, 
and hence that a decentralisation policy 
is desirable (Viljoen Commission, 1958). 
But the literature, as illustratedtby World 
Bank reports, rejects such a position 
(Linn, 1982). Another popular view is 
that the rural poor are better off than 
the urban poor, but his is definitely not 
the case (Mazundar, 1976). The govern­
ment, via frequent public comment and 
also via official documents (National Phy­
sical Development Plan, 1975), has also 
claimed that the cities are becoming 'too 
large'. Here too the literature is sceptical, 
and the claim was refuted more than a. 
decade ago (Alonso, 1971). 
The fundamental purpose of the ID poli­
cies kto increase the proportion of the 
' black,labour force which can be residertt 
in the homelands (Bell, 1973). The reason 
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word n oorsig gegee van die institusionele 
enfinansie1e ree1ings (ooreenkomste) wat 
getrefis sedert 1981. Die derde dee/gee n 
oorsig van die tipes van ree1ings, en hoe­
kom dit nodig was. Die finale dee/ bevat 
voorspellings van die effek wat die beleid 
van industrie1e desentralisasie op die pri­
vate sektor gaan he. 
for keeping blacks out of the cities ties 
the ID policy intimately into that of 
'grand' apartheid. Grand apartheid, as 
reflected in the ongoing constitutional 
initiatives, is essentially an attempt to 
retain white hegemony over CASA (com­
mon area of South Africa). Blacks are to 
be present in cities to the extent that 
their presence is economically necessary. 
(When possible, through resettlement and 
the creation of townships within home­
land borders, blacks are to become 'com­
muter' labourers.) Beyond this, their phy­
sical location, and the political linkage 
of all blacks, is to be to the homelands. 
The physical isolation of surplus black 
labour and the political 'denationalisa­
tion' of blacks are viewed by the state as 
central to the continuation of white hege­
mony. The institutional and financial 
changes which have been implemented 
in respect to ID policy can be attdbuted 
directly to these ends. The description 
and interpretation of these changes occur 
in the third section. We now turn to an 
overview of the institutional and financial 
arrangements for implementing ID policy 
that existed circa 1981. 
The Institutions of Industrial 
Decentralisation and their Financing 
circa 1981. 
Institutions 
The institutions responsible for implement­
ing the ID policy, their interrelationships, 
and the financing of the policy are most 
easily understood by reference to dia­
grams and tables. Fig. I shows the posi­
tion circa 198 l. The key institutions are 
those in bold type. Table I summarizes 
the position of the homeland develop­
ment corporations (DCs) in terms of their 
asset base and their debt and equity 
Fig 1: Institutional Arrangements circa 1981. ' 
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Table I: The Financial Structure of the Development Corporation prior to the Formation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa.
Development Total Net 
Corporation of' Assets(Rm) Debt/ Equityi Equity Source 
Bophuthatswana (1982/83) 1 260,5 0,26 Bophuthatswana Government 
Ciskei (1982) 90,5 0,60 Ciskei Government 
Transkei (1981) 147,1 0,03 Transkei Government 
Venda (1981/82) 28,9 0,18 Venda Government 
Gazankulu (1981) 18,5 0,42 CEO and SADT 
KaNgwane (1982) 31,5 0,73 CEO and SADT 
KwaNdebele - a Development Corporation is currently being established 
KwaZulu (1982) 85,2 0,76 CEO and SADT 
Lebowa (1982) 28,2 0,46 CEO an� SADT 
Qwa Qwa (1982) 9,2 0,07 CEO and SADT 
Other 
Corporation for Economic 876,83 0,78 
Development (1983) 
Industrial Development 638,94 0,57 
Corporation (1983) 
Small Business Development 139,6 0,55 
Corporation ( 1983) 
Source: Annual Reports of the respective Development Corporations 
I. The figure in brackets indicates to which year the data apply.
2. Long-term debt including minority shareholders' interest/ equity.
3. The amount excludes CEO holdings in the Development Corporations.
SADT 
Department of Industries 
Private sector (50%), 
S.A. Government (50%) 
Major Debt Source 










Local Stock and Loans (56%), 
Investments in CEO Savings Bank 
(25%), Minority Shareholding (18%) 
Export Fina.nee Notes (47%), Foreign 
Loans (31 %), Local Loan Stock (20%) 
South African Government (96%) 
- interest free
4. The amount represents 20,6% of the IDCs application of funds, as this was the amount allocated to industrial decentralisation.
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The function of the CED depended on more apparent when we look at their 
whether the homeland was 'independent' financing. 
or 'self-governing'. In the case of self- When the CED was approached by an 
governing homelands the CED was respon- industrialist interested in decentralisa-
sible for large industrial projects (factory tion, the CED passed the application on 
size in excess of 500 m2), the construe- to the Decentralisation Board (DB) (see 
tion on industrial parks, commercial agri- __ Fig. I). The Board decided whether to
cultural projects, operating a training approve the project in principle, meaning 
bureau, transport companies, and for the whether and what level of concessions 
research function undertaken by BENSO. would be made available to the industria-
The DCs were responsible for small, local list, but it was up to the industrialist 
industrialists, commercial development, concerned to obtain a 'soft' loan from 
tourism, providing housing for the manage- the CED or the DC concerned. The pro-
rial staff of decentralising companies, and cedure described applied to projects in 
training. When a homeland became inde- the self-governing homelands. 
pendent, its DC assumed all the functions 
listed above. Because CED staff were 
seconded to the DCs, however, and be­
cause the CED has management contracts 
with some of the activities falling under 
the DCs, in many respects the CED was 
stil the effective implementing and de­
cision-making body. The dependence of 
the ·Dcs on the CED will become even 
In the case of independent homelands, 
when a homeland became independent, 
responsibility for budgetary aid and de­
velopment assistance was passed on to 
the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Information. The agency of the Depart­
ment is called the Committee for, Econo­
mic Development and Cooperation in 
Southern Africa(CEDCSA). It acted as 
the Foreign Affairs equivalent of the 
CED, and largely replaced the CED in 
the independent homelands. (Neverthe­
less, in 1983 the CED provided R8,49 
million of financial aid to the indepen­
dent homelands for the establishment of 
industries.) 
The IDC has pursued the decentralisa­
tion since its inception in 1940. Its area 
of responsibility has been outside the 
homelands. The traditional role of the 
IDC has been that of "providing loan 
and other financial facilities at subsidised 
interest rates to industrialists establishing 
themselves in the decentralised areas of 
the Republic". (IDC Annual Report, 
1982, p.7.) In 1983 21 percent or Rl40 
million of the IDCs application of funds 
was for decentralisation purposes. At the 
time of writing (May, 1984 ), however, 
legislation was enacted to enable the IDC 
to operate in the independent homelands 
as well. 
Table 2: Sectoral Composition, Number and Private Sector Capital Contribution of Applications to the Decentralisation Board/or 
Decentralisation Concessions, 1982 / 83 1 
Capital Commitment Applicants Potential 
Sector Rm (%of Total) Number (%of Total) Job Creation 
Paper and paper products 909,5 (37) 29 (3,7) u 
N 
Chemicals, - and chemical, petroleum, coal, rubber A 
and plastic products 565,4 (23) 64 (8,2) V 
A 
Textiles, wearing apparel and leather industries 345,1 (14) 170 (21,9) I 
L 
Food, beverages and tobacco 208,1 (8,5) 87 (11,2) A 
B 
Fabricated metal products excluding machinery 
and equipment 192,0 (8) 149 (19,2) L 
E 
Other 239,5 (9,7) 278 (35,8) 
Total 2 459,8 777 (100) 65 342
Of which, Foreign contribution 142,9 (5,8) 55 (7,1) 13 895
Source: Decentralisation Board, Annual Report, Annexure D and p. , 1982/83. 
I. The experience of the Decentralisation Board has been that in the case of slightly less than half the apP.lications, subsequent investment actually takes place. The
figures do not include applications for industrial establishment in the independent homelands.
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As regards the nature and extent of pri-­
vate sector investment in the homelands, 
refer to Tables 2 and 3. Most industrial 
decentralisation into the homelands oc­
curs in the form of b,ranch plants and/ or 
subsidiaries (Maasdorp, 1982). The DB 
has records as to the number of ap­
plicants per industrial sector, but appa­
rently not as regards the capital invest­
ment and employment creation within 
those sectors. The information provided 
in Table 2 cannot therefore be presumed 
to be typical of the sectoral composition 
of decentralised investment. The number 
of applicants for decentralisation conces­
sions in Tables 2 and 3, 777, is likewise 
not typical. The experience of the DB 
has been that slightly less than half of 
approved applications are subsequently 
implemented. Even given the scaling down 
of 777 by this amount to 380, the number 
of applicants/potential investment has 
increased markedly. Table 3 indicates 
the projects or expansions actually imple­
mented and the employment creation 
which occurred between 1975 and 1981. 
The potential increase of decentralised 
activity, no doubt due to the new conces­
sion package, 1 is obvious, especially as 
the increase has occurred during an econo­
mic recession. 
From Table 2 it can be seen that the 
anticipated employment creation from 
April I 1982 to March 31 1983 was about 
32 OOO jobs, a half of 65 342. Interna­
tional investors will contribute about 
6 500 jobs, a half of 13 895. However, to 
refer to employment creation in these 
terms is misleading. The Decentralisa­
tion Board offers a figure of 6 percent as 
to the number of jobs not created, but 
relocated. Furthermore, 1t is unclear how 
many of the jobs claimed to have been 
created existed in businesses which sub­
sequently failed. Decentralisation Board 
officials claim that the failure rate is in­
significant. However Russell (1972) 
queries this. The authors' current re­
search info private sector aspects of the 
decentralisation programme will throw 
additional light on this question. 
A disturbing point for employment crea­
tion is that, with respect to capital com­
mitted, the predominant sectors in 
· 1982/ 83 are the relatively capital inten­
sive paper and paper products industry,
and the chemical industry. Two other
factors are also relevant to a discussion
of employment creation. These are sec­
tions 2 and 3 of the Environment Plan­
ning Act No. 104 of 1977, formerly known 
as the Physical Planning and Utilization 
of Resources Act No. 88 of 1967. It was 
throught this Act that the government 
restricted the zoning of industrial land 
and the establishment or extension of 
factories in 'controlled' areas. Establish­
ment or extension was defined as the 
hiring of additional black labour. Section 
2 deals with the zoning of land for indus­
trial purposes, the establishment of indus­
trial townships, the subdivision of indus­
trial land and the granting of consent 
use for industrial purposes. The controls 
are being used to limit the supply of 
industrial land in the metropolitan areas, 
to drive up the price of such land, and 
hence to cause industrialists to seek non­
metropolitan locations for their activities. 
An indication of the success of the policy 
as regards the price of industrial land is 
that apparently industrial land in Atlanta, 
Georgia, a city which has a similar indus­
trial structure and size to Johannesburg, 
costs one-tenth that of Johannesburg. 
The Section 2 restrictions are adminis­
tered by the 'Committee of Seven' which 
has eight members: from the Departments 
of Constitutional Development and Plan­
ning, Community Development, Coopera­
tion and Development, Labour, Internal 
Affairs, Industries, Health and Environ­
mental Affairs. As indicated in Fig. 2, 
the fact that land has been zoned for 
industrial purposes does not mean that 
approval will be granted for the establish­
ment of an industrial township. For 
example, if an existing industrial town-
. ship is less than 70 percent occupied, 
then permission for the establishment of 
a new township is unlikely to be granted. 
However the 70 percent figure is not the 
rule. With occupancy rates above it, mat­
ters are still open to interpretation. 
Another example is that of Midrand 
Township. Township rights will not be 
granted for industrially zoned land unless 
the.developer has a tenant lined up. Since 
township development takes 3-5 years, 
this is an onerous restriction. In this in­
stance the prohibition is in order to spur 
the take up of land in the nearby Ver­
woerdburg. In the opinion of most obser­
vers, all potential restrictions are inter­
preted as narrowly as possible. 
The Guide Plan referred to in Figure 2 is 
"an accepted enforceable policy docu­
ment which is drafted by the parties ac­
cording to prescribed procedures in which 
land usage of specific areas within the 
prescribed boundaries is indicated" 
(South African Yearbook, 1984, p.329). 
The formulation of Guide Plan goes 
through various stages, but with three 
basic divisions. In the first instance, a 
drafting committee with about forty mem­
bers from central, local and provincial 
government prepares a confidential plan. 
In the next stage the plan is circulated 
for public comment. Finally, the docu­
ment is published. Nevertheless, even 
prior to approval of the plan it is very 
difficult to have for example, the zoning 
of land changed to 'for industrial pur­
poses'. 
Table 3: Projects Established, Capital Invested and Employment Created under the auspices of 
the Decentralisation Board, 1975-19831
Projects Established Private Sector Employment 
Year or Expanded Capital Investment (Rm) Creation 
1975 59 68,2 5 730 
1976 91 87,9 6 738 
1977 136 174 12 469 
1978 123 112 8 408 
1979 175 132 II 178 
1980 152 140 11 421 
1981 214 245 II 792 
1982/832 777 2 459,8 65 342 
Balance of 1983 816 3 324,2 116 036 
\ 
Source: Decentralisation Board, Annual Reports 1981 and 1982 / 83: and also discussions with. 
Decentralisation Board officials. 
I. The data refers to both in and outside of the homelands. Up to and including 1981, the reporting year
was the relevant calendar year. Thereafter it is April I to March 31 of the following year, April being
when the now decentralisation concession package began.
2. The figures reflect proposed projects. In practice, 42,8 percent of proposed projects are actually
implemented.
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The Guide Plan Committees shown in 
various Figures were established on the 
recommendation of the Niemand Com­
mission of 197 l ,  and have operated with 
statutory authority since 1975. The Com­
mittees operate under the Department 
of Constitutional Development and Plan­
ning (prior to this Department's form­
ation, under the Department of Planning 
and also the Office of the Prime Minis­
ter.) 
�If the Provincial Administrator shown 
in Figure 2 approves the industrial town­
ship application, the occupant of the land 
still faces the section 3 hurdle. The section 
3 restrictions are used to control the fur­
ther employment of Black labour in the 
metropolitan areas, the 'controlled areas'. 
The section was phrased with regard to 
the establishment or extension of a fac­
tory, either of which required Ministerial 
approval. Establishment or extension re­
ferred to the hiring of additional Black 
labour. The nature of the Section 3 restric­
tions has varied over time (Tomlinson, 
1983). The restrictions have not been 
rigorously applied. For example, during 
1982 the restrictions were waived in the 
cases of 90 percent of the applications 
for waiver. Yet over time the number of 
jobs affected has added up. Between 1968 
and 1980 115 OOO jobs were affected, very 
few of which were subsequently decen­
tralised. Job creation was even more detri­
mentally affected through indirect means. 
In 1969, for example, the Minister of 
Labour claimed that through controls 
on the zoning of industrial land and re­
strictions on the use of that land, the 
creation of a further 220 OOO jobs was 
foregone (Beeld, 9 November, 1969; cited 
in Gottschalk, 1977). The periods are 
discontinuous and the data available is 
not up to date, but the obvious point is 
that the government has chosen to active­
ly discourage employment creation in a 
country with high levels of unemploy­
ment. 
More recently, the implications of such 
a cavalier attitude to employment crea­
tion were spelled out by the Riekert Com­
mission (I 979, par. 5.84(a)): 
In view of the political, economic and 
social implications of the evergrowing 
Black labour corps and the concomi­
tant unemployment, any measure which 
like section 3, is designed to curb the 
creation of job opportunities.in a parti­
cular area and to stop a person from 
Fig 2: The Process of Establishing an Industrial Township 
G. P. = Guide Plan 
yes 
apply to Commtttee 
of Seven for 
sec. 2 rights 
yes 






working where his presence is lawful 
and housing is available for him, is 
unrealistic and indefensible. 
In terms of the recommendations of the 
Commission,· the section 3 restrictions 
are to be replaced by more expensive 
infrastructure and public services in the 
metropolitan areas (Van der Kooy, 1982). 
Finance 
As regards the financial arrangements 
circa 198 l, the DCs of the self-governing 
homelands were owned by the CEO and 
the South African Development Trust 
(SADT). The latter two institutions each 
held 50 percent of the issued shares of 
the DCs. The SADT falls under the De­
partment of Cooperation and Develop­




apply to G.P. 
Committee for 
amendment to G.P. 
no 
to local authority 
for approval 
CED was itself wholly owned by the 
SADT. Various transport, agricultural 
and other companies are under the 
ownership and control of the DCs. In all 
instances, therefore, the financing and 
control can be traced back to the De­
partment of Cooperation and Develop­
ment. 
The DCs of independent homelands are 
owned by the governments of those 
national states. The CEO and SADT
shareholding in the development cor­
porations of these homelands was handed 
over to the respective governments with­
out charge. 
All the DCs have low debt/equity ratios, 
refer Table I. In certain instances the 
ratios are very low indeed. The owners 
of DC equity are described above. With 
the exception of the Bophuthatswana 
National Development Corporation, the 
debt source of each of the DCs is again 
the CEO. The position of the Bophut­
hatswana DC is distinct in that the DC 
earns revenue from its shareholding in a 
number of profitable concerns, for exam­
ple, Sun City. It is therefore not entirely 
dependent on concessionary financing 
and has successfully entered the domestic 
and international capital market. 
In Table 4 the financial contributions of 
the Departments of Cooperation and 
Development and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs are indicated. Their ex­
penditure on, in order, budgetary aid, 
land consolidation, resettlement, and de­
velopment will exceed R2 billion during 
1984/85. The amount includes R347 mil­
lion which is a direct charge on the State 
Revenue Fund, but excludes other re­
latively minor aspects to their involve­
ment in the homelands. In other words, 
the table refers to major programme ex­
penditures. R2 billion is a not insub­
stantial figure. The programme order list­
ed above indicates that the government's 
priority is the constitutional development 
of the homelands as 'nations' rather than 
economic development per se. With in­
delicate irony and consistent thinking, 
the section on resettlement in the Depart­
ment of Cooperation and Development's 
annual report falls under the chapter, 
'Constitutional Services'. Given that re­
settlement is forced on Blacks, and that 
at certain resettlement camps the infant 
mortality rate has exceeded 50 percent 
(Sparks, 1983), such benign interpret­
ations of policy are Orwellian. The SADT 
is the Department of Cooperation and 
Development's agency through which the 
programmes described in Table 4 are 
implemented, and is shown as such in 
Fig. I. 
Table 4: Relevanl Programme Expendi1u;es of1he Deparlmenl of Cooperalion and Developmenl and 1he Depar1men1 of Foreign Affairs 
and i'!fcJrma1ion. 1978/79 - /984/ 85 (Rm)1 
lnstilUlion/ Purpose 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Departmenl c!f' Cooperalion and Developemenl 
Development of Black areas, towards self-determination 
- consolidation of Black areas2 42 69 90 81 65 162 128 
- development towards self-determination3 ( 109 132 147 198 186 218 294 
Assistance to Governments of self-governing homelanos4 122 166 247 440 488 621 786 
- plus a direct charge. on the State Revenue Funds
177 192 204 219 196 207 227 
Department c�f' Foreign Affairs and l'!formalion6 
Development assistance7 28 161 257 433 506 517 
- plus a direct charge on the State Revenue Fund8 184 136 60 45 120 121 120 
Source: Republic of South Africa. fatimate of' Expenditure to he defrayed.from the State Revenue Account, relevant years. 
I. Except for 1984/ 85. the data represent not the budgeted expenditure but the actual expenditure, obtained by looking back at the previous year's data, for
example. from the 1979/80 data when looking at the 1980/81 estimate. The expenditure amounts in the table are total expenditure, not the amount to be voted.
2. Purchase of land and settlement.
3. Primarily the settlement of persons and employment and income generation. Also the infrastructure, social services, government planning and administration,
development of human potential and land conservation.
4. Administrative and technical assistance, financial aid. 
5. Grants made in Lerms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act No. 21 of 1971, sec. 6(2)(c).
6. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Information became involved with independent homelands, and largely replaced the Department of Cooperation and
Development with respect to these homelands.
7. Technical and budgetary aid •. Oour subsidies, industry incentives, relief of distress, manpower provision and other aid. 
8. The counterpart of 5, as applied to the independent homelands and the Acts through which they obtained financial aid. The expenditure amounts vary so greatly 
due to the way in which expenditure was categorized. 
9. This is the amount to be voted. The actual expenditure amount, usually higher, was unavailable. 
A rather glaring omission from the fo_re­
going discussion is the absence of refer­
ence to the institutions involved in the 
construction of infrastructure and the 
financing of such activities. The various 
institutions which contributed in this re­
gard include investment by the CEO in 
infrastructure, expenditure by the rele-
-vant homeland Ministries, loans to local
authorities outside the homelands by the 
Department of Community Develop­
ment, expenditure by the IDC on indus­
trial townships outside the homelands, 
and investment by the South African 
Transport Services, ESCOM and the 
SADT. Data covering all the expenditure 
is unavailable. The little information 
available to the authors is summarised 
below. 
I. Commitments by the IDC between
1960 and March 31, 1983 were (De­
centralisation Board, Annual Report,
1982/83):
industrial township 
housing for key 
personnel 
Total 
R696 800 000 
156 851 723 
R850 651 723 
Apparently the provision of housing 
is critical since its absence is a major 
obstacle in retaining the personnel who 
17 
are to be moved. 
2. Between March 27 · 1962 and March
31 1983, the Department of Com­
munity Development loaned R 183,4
million to local authorities for the con­
struction of infrastructure. The type
of authorities concerned were, for
example, Britz, Atlantis, Roslyn and
Tzaneen.
3. An official of the South African Trans­
port Services claimed that railway con­
nections to industrial development
points are only constructed if it is an
economic proposition. If the proposi­
tion is uneconomic but a decentralised
industrialist desires such a connection, 
then the investment will only be under­
taken if the industrialist undertakes 
to pay for any losses incurred. The 
same official then stated that "You 
don't know what we are doing and 
how involved we are", and then be­
came reticent. This involvement may 
well deal more with the transportation 
of commuter labour than industrial 
goods. As pointed out by Van Keyser­
lingk ( 1984), the loss by the Transport 
Services in 1983 of R750 million was 
largely due to the subsidised transport 
of Black labour from uneconomic 
residential sites. 
4. CEO investment in infrastructure is
particularly important as it is the
CEO which constructed industrial
townships in the self-governing home­
lands. However data regarding the
amount spent by the CEO is con­
fusing. For example, in 1982 tbe CEO
spent R 70,5 million on the acquisi­
tion of fixed assets ( 1983 - R 94,6 mil­
lion)2; yet in 1982 the CEO acknow­
ledges spending R0,84 million on
infrastructure ( 1983 - R33 million)
and R32,3 million ( 1983 - R33 million)
on buildings and loans (CEO, 1981,
Fig 3: Implementing Bodies, 1984 
1 
1982 Annual Reports); but in the South 
African Yearbook ( 1984) it is claimed 
that thlCED spent nothing on infra­
structure in 1981 / 82 ( p.251 ). Such data 
uncertainties illustrate the problem of 
arriving at precise numbers. 
5. The DBs expenditure on concessions
between 1975 and 1984 are shown in
Table 5. The data reveal a steady in­
crease in concession expenditure,
from R 13, 19 million in 1981 to R 162,2
million in 1983/84.
Institutional and Financial Arrange­
ments as of 1984 
Aside from the institutions created as a 
result of the constitutional initiatives (see 
Fig. 4 and 5, Policy Making Institutions), 
the most significant institutional change 
has been the 'replacement' of the CEO 
by the DBSA (see Fig. 3). The CEO was 
a 'top down' institution, with financial 
and policy making control resting in the 
hands of the South African government. 
As such, it had become an anachronism. 
If the government's desire for future 
'confederation' was to be achieved, then 
a 'multi-lateral' (read multi-national) 
institution was necessary. The DBSA, a 
Department of Cooperation 
and Development 
Department of Constitutional 





1. Only !he more s1gnihcant bodies and mterrelat1onsr11ps 
are. mdtcated. Ma101 actors are 1nd1ca1ed in bold type 
multi-lateral body modelled on the World 
Bank, constitutes the first major con­
federal institution. The Bank will take 
over most of the CEO functions. In 
addition, it replaces the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and the SADT insofar 
as all development capital flows to the 
national states are to occur through the 
Bank. 
The multilateral structure of the DBSA 
means that each member state contributes 
a share of the Bank's capital, and each 
state has voting power on its board large­
ly proportionate to its capital contri­
bution. The current contributions and 
voting power are shown in Table 6. 
Given South Africa's voting power, the 
Bank remains South African controlled. 
The self-governing national states are re­
presented in the Bank by the South Afri­
can delegation. In many respects though, 
the Bank does represent a qualitatively 
new institution. This is symbolized by 
such factors as the location of the bank 
in Sandton rather than Pretoria, having 
English as an official language, and by 
the attempt to distance the Bank from 
politics and to create a business-like 
image. 
Department of Industries. 
Commerce and Tourism 
DECENTRALISATION 
BOARD 
of self-governing homelands of independant homelands 
18 





















Source: Decentralisation Board, Annual Reports 1981 (Schedule D) and 1982/ 83 (p.24). 
I. The data include interest and rental concessions, income tax concessions, cash allowances in lieu of
tax concessions, transport rebates on harbour dues, transport rebate on railage, and reimbursement of
removal costs.
The data e�clude subsidised loans and housing loans. The value of a loan subsidy can range from 1,5
percent (eg. at Britz) to 8 percent (eg. at Phuthaditjhaba).
2. The data appears to be for comparable expenditure categories. The 1983 / 84 amount is the budgeted
amount.
Table 6: Capital Contribution to, and Voting Power in, the DBSA 
Member Capital Contribution (Rm) Votes 
Bophuthatswana 100 500 
Ciskei 70 440 
South Africa 1 680 3 660 
Transkei 100 500 
Venda 50 400 
Source: Articles of Agreement, Development Bank of Southern Africa. 
The Bank's goals are (DBSA, Articles of 
Agreement, p.2): 
(i) to promote economic development
(ii) to reduce regional economic balances
(iii) to promote public and private invest-
ment which will have developmental
impacts in the homelands, and itself
to raise capital in order to finance
development expenditure
(iv) to provide soft loans to its members
(v) to provide technical assistance and
training ..
It is specified that the Bank will not com­
pete with the private financial sector. It 
will serve needs· not met by the private 
sector, and its 
"operations will therefore be concen­
trated on aspects such as infrastructural 
development in which the private sector 
cannot, or will not, become involved 
because of the long pay back periods 
and the high proportion of indirect, non­
chargeable benefits that such projects 
entail." (Press Release, 15 June, 1983, 
p.4)
The DBSA has replaced the CED role of 
providing infrastructure, and in this regard 
has also assumed some of the financing 
functions of the SADT and the CEDCSA. 
The role of the CEDCSA has been cut 
back considerably, with many of its per­
sonnel having joined the Bank. The future 
role of the CEDCSA will deal with re­
quests for aid from, for example, the 
Comoros Islands. The Bank has taken 
over about 80 CEDCSA projects, which 
means in effect, that the Bank will finance 
these projects with funds supplied by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs. In this 
respect, therefore, the estimated expendi­
ture of the Depa,rtment for 1984 / 85 in 
Table 4 does not represent expenditure 
by the Department per se. 
The debt owed to the CED by the DCs 
will be taken over by the DBSA. At this 
point (May, 1984), the matching assets 
, which will serve as collateral have still to 
be decided on. The equity held by the 
CED and the SADT wil be handed over 
to the homeland governments free of 
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charge, as occurred with the independent 
homelands when they became indepen­
dent. 
The initial equity issued by the Bank is 
shown in Table 6. The authorised ordi­
nary capital stock is R2 OOO million. In 
addition, the South African government 
intends to provide R I 500 million in 
interest-free loan capital over the next 
five years; and to raise on the Bank's 
behalf a sum which could also amount 
to R I 500 million, primarily in the domes­
tic capital market, over the next five 
years (South African Digest, 4 November, 
1983). The resources to be made available 
to the Bank are enormous. 
The DB retains its old role of consi­
dering applications for concessions. The 
board will in future also be responsible 
for ensuring coordination among the var­
ious relevant institutions, and for evalu-
ating and reporting on decentralisation 
progress to the various governments. In 
many respects, though, the DB budget 
of R 162,2 million for the 1983 / 84 finan­
cial year indicates the extent to which its 
influence has been eclipsed by the DBSA. 
The IDC will no longer p-rovide soft 
loans to decentralising companies. While 
it will provide loans to such companies, 
it is up to the company concerned to 
negotiate the terms of the loan by apply­
ing for concession to the DB. The signifi­
cance of the JDC in the decentralisation 
effort has been diminished due to the 
role of the private sector capital market 
in the new scheme of things. Specifically, 
private banks can supply capital to de­
centralising companies and can act on 
their behalf to obtain concessions from 
the DB. 
The Small Business Division of the IDC 
has been hived off and set up as the 
Small . Business Development Corpora­
tion (SBDC). The Indian Industrial De­
velopment Corporation and the Develop­
ment and Finance Corporation (Col­
oured) have been joined to the SBDC. 
Although the activities of the SBDC have 
been specified to be located in South 
Africa's urban areas, the SBDC has in 
fact done business in the homelands. 
Among the DCs'the SBDC is unique in 
that its capital has, in part, been contri­
buted by the private sector (see Table I). 
The private sector contribution follows 
on the Carlton Centre Conference- of 
1979, and the call by Dr.· Rupert for the 
government to have ,a proactive policy 
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for small business development. In part, 
the reason for establishing the SBDC 
follows from a concern with u·nemploy­
ment, and international comparisons 
which consistently reveal that the major­
ity of a country's labour force is located 
in small businesses, and that the growth 
of this sector contributes most to employ­
ment creation. A more political interpre­
tation would also be mindful of the need 
expressed by public and private sector 
representatives to cr:eate a relatively con­
servative Black middle-class which is com­
mitted to capitalism. 
Of equal interest to the formation of the 
DBSA is the formation of new policy­
making bodies (see Figs. 4 and 5). Func­
tions formerly undertaken within the De­
partment of the Prime Minister have been 
moved into the Department of Constitu­
tional Development and Planning. The 
latter department was created in and the 
Department of the Prime Minister re­
verted to its former name, Office of the 
Prime Minister. The Office of the Prime 
Minister retained the Planning Advisory 
Council. Known as the Resources and 
Planning, Advisory Council when it was 
created in 1966, the Council's purpose 
was to advise what was then the Minister 
of the Department of Planning on the 
promotion and the effective utilization 
of resources on a national and a regional 
basis, and also on national physical plan­
ning policy. The Council consists of both 
public and private sector personnel. Since 
1968 the agenda of the Council has been 
set by the Office of the Prime Minister, 
and is that of regional planning. 
The Economics and the Physical Plan­
ning Branches of the Office of the Prime 
Minister have been shifted into the 
Department of Constitutional Develop­
ment and Planning. These branches, to­
gether with the newly created branch of 
Constitutional Planning, and the Plan­
ning Advisory Council, are central to 
the formulation of regional policy, as 
indicated in Fig. 4. The Physical planning 
Branch is concerned with the revision of 
the National Physical Development Plan 
of 1975 in terms of the eight development 
regions defined by the 1982 White Paper. 
The Economic Planning Branch is in­
volved in the formulation of Regional 
Economic Development Programs, essen­
tially a spatial off-shoot of the national 
Economic Development Program. The 
Branch is obviously concerned with the 
formulation of regional policy, especially 
the ID program. The Constitutional Plan­
ning Branch and the Planning Advisory 
Council also contribute to regional policy 
formulation. The latter body contributes 
as well to policy on the organizational 
structure for regional development. Need­
less to say, all these policy areas are 
interconnected, and they are shown as 
such in Fig. 4. 
Other relevant bodies are the Regional 
Development Advisory Committees, crea­
ted in 1983. Their actual and potential 
contribution to policy-making is uncer­
tain. Their brief is sufficiently vague and 
their powers so few as to leave some 
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doubt as to whether they will ever achieve 
any significant impact on policy formu­
lation: As described by a Committee mem­
ber, a strong personality in one of the 
Committees can probably use it as a 
vehicle to obtain advantages for, for exam­
ple, a specific town or region. The pur­
pose of the Committees is to "advise the 
Government on all regional development 
matters for which the State has to accept 
responsibility"(Department of Constitu­
tional Development and Planning, 1983, 
p.3). Such advice should focus mainly
on "the provision of infrastructure and
the promotion of a development climate
within which the private sector can
prosper" (ibid.). The Committees are
made up of members from the com­
ponent Regional Development Associa­
tions which serve the economic develop­
ment regions of the National Physical
Development Plan, local goverment
bodies of all races, provincial government,
and private sector associations, for
example, ASSOCOM. Provision is also
made for membership by the independent
homelands. The Committees operate un­
der the Physical Planning Branch of the
Department of Constitutional Develop­
ment and Planning. Where the activities
of the Committees do not affect the inde�
pendent homelands, their acitivities are
coordinated by the National Regional
Development Advisory Council. When
the Committees do affect the independent
homelands, then they are coordinated
by the Regional Liaison Committees
which are described below (see Figures 4
and 5 respectively).
Sitting above the plethora of bodies just 
described, including the different De­
partments and the Office of the Prime 
Minister, is the Multilateral Development 
Council of Ministers, see Fig. 5. This 
Council is described as the 'supreme re­
gional policy-making' body. Just as the 
DBSA is multilateral, so too this Council 
is multilateral. On the technical side the 
Council is supported by various commit­
tees,- especially the Economics and Fi­
nance Committees. Regional Liaison Com­
mittees exist for each of the eight develop­
ment regions, and each Committee has 
an equal number of representatives from 
the Regional Development Advisory Com­
mittees of the 'countries' concerned. In 
the case of self-governing homelands, 
their members will be a part of the South 
African delegation to the Council. The 
Fig 5: The Multi-Lateral Policy-Making and 
'Joint Action' Structure, 1984 
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Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, Pretoria
2. There are seven committees Agriculture and environment
affairs: Industries. commerce and tourism: Transport: Posts 
and telecommunications; Health and welfare: Manpower 
. 
I 
and education: Financial Relations: plus various sub-
. committees and working groups
3. The Interstate Working Group acts as a planning l>ody,
its function being to review progress made within the
system and to recommend on new organizational structures.
4. The Interim Secretariat engages in administrative coordination.
Its stall are provid�d by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
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purpose of the Regional Liaison Com­
mittees.. is the "coordination of those 
development matters which transcend in­
ternational boundaries" (ibid., p.7). The 
Committees will not, however, be able 
to conclude official agreements and Com­
mittee members will report back to their 
respective authorities. 
'Besides membership from the independent 
homelands, the Multilateral Council has 
members from the Departments of Con­
stitutional Development and Planning, 
Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and De­
velopment, Industries and Agriculture. 
The Minister of Constitutional Develop­
ment and Planning, Mr. Heunis, chairs 
the Council. Presumably, then, the re­
gional policy decisions described above 
wil be formulated by South Africa's 
governmental departments with due re­
gard to the views of the Multilateral 
Council. The extent of homeland in­
fluence in the Council is uncertain. Like 
the DBSA, it would seem reasonable to 
presume that those footing the bill will 
call the tune. 
If the above maze of institutions seems 
complex, the reader should consider the 
adjustments due with the forthcoming 
constitutional dispensation. 
Conclusion 
As noted, the ID policy is directed to 
creating the semblance of an economic 
base in the homelands. This base is neces­
sary if the location of surplus Black 
labour and the political linkage of Blacks 
to the homelands are to have any legiti­
macy. That the creation of the base is 
being.done to the detriment of employ­
ment creation for Blacks and of the Black 
share of national income (Tomlinson, 
1983), is of little consequence. If grand 
apartheid is to be implemented, then the 
negative welfare impacts for Blacks are a 
necessary consequence. 
the changing institutional form of 'the 
ID policy is not so easily explained. In­
stead one must refer to the fact that 
"Repression alone was no longer regarded 
as a sufficient method of containing the 
situation. Leading representatives of both 
the state and capital, such as the Prime 
Minister and Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, 
warned repeatedly of the dangers of -a 
'revolution' unless the original apartheid 
formula was adapted or reformed" (Zille, 
1983, p.61). It is this task which the Prime 
Minister is presently undertaking. His 
aim 'is to defuse the opposition through 
creating a complex set of alliances be­
tween the state and sections of the Black 
population, while at the same time keep­
ing intact the essentials of grand apart­
heid, the homelands and influx control 
(Tomlinson and Hyslop, 1984). 
The multilateral nature of the new in­
stitutions is directed to bringing about 
the confederal ambitions of the govern­
ment. Within a c.onfederal structure, 
Blacks will be denationalised. As an as­
pect of the confederal system, a large 
relatively well:.off Black bureaucracy is 
being created. As a result of the opera­
tions of institutions such as the DCs and 
the SBDC, a black middle-class depen­
dent on state support and capitalism is 
emerging. In sum, a Black middle-class 
with vested interests in the continued 
existence of the homelands is being creat­
ed. The middle-class in turn will provide 
support for the rulers of these homelands, 
and create a buffer between the poor 
and the exercise of authority. 
The possibility that the tail might wag 
the dog is obviously rather limited. The 
Multilateral Development Council of 
Ministers is unlikely to provide more 
than a ratification for Cabinet decisions 
made by the South African government. 
In fact, the current state of the institu­
tional arrangements is nothing if not con­
fusing. There are too many bodies with 
ill-defined powers or no power at all. 
The guide always is to the institutions 
which monopolise the control of force 
and the purse strings, the South African 
government. 
The bill, however, is exorbitant. The 
duplication bureaucracies such as in the 
North-Eastern Transvaal - Venda, Le­
bowa, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, the pro­
vincial administration - and the retention 
of Black population in the rural areas 
creates a need for aid shown earlier to be 
rapidly growing, and currently exceeding 
R2 billion per annum. As acknowledged 
by the Prime Minister in Parliament, the 
government does not know the financial 
implications of South Africa's constitu­
tional changes - a sort of budgetary wild 
card. The rhetoric regarding the primacy 
of the private sector is not to bar the way· 
to increased public sector actions in the 
capital market, and an increased absorp­
tion of skilled manpower. Economic 
growth and controlling inflation are less 
of an imperative than implementing· 
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apartheid. As Verwoerd constantly warn­
ed the public, if you want apartheid you 
will have to pay for it. 
The private sector has come to cooperate 
with the ID policy. Whereas in 1968 it 
resisted the ID legislation, now South 
Africa's largest corporations have pro­
mised DB officials that decentralised loca­
tions will always be considered when new 
investment opportunities are evaluated. 
The more formal involvement of the pri­
vate sector- in the ID process was dis­
played at the Carlton and Cape of Good 
Hope conferences, and is evident from 
the position of private sector represent­
atives on the boards of the DBSA, 
SBDC, the Planning Advisory Council, 
its role in the Regional Development 
Advisory Committees, and so on. Need­
less to say, this participation has been 
exacted at a price. The decentralisation 
incentives have been officially described 
as the 'best in the world'. (This translates 
into the most expensive to the public fisc.) 
Greater participation in implementing 
the policy is expanded through, for exam­
ple, the role of private sector banks. In 
sum, the more rewarding relationship be­
tween the government and capital reflects 
the Prime Minister's shift in constituen­
cies, most obviously away from the Afri­
kaner right-wing. But it also appears to 
represent private sector involvement in 
and commitment to the new forms of 
implementing apartheid. As indicated by 
last year's referendum, much of the Eng­
lish speaking 'liberal' vote views the con­
stitutional change as reform oriented and 
worth supporting. More concretely than 
hitherto, the private sector can no longer 
support a liberal facade, one distant from 
the politics of apartheid. It is·immersed 
in it. 
Notes 
I. In a recent paper, Bell (1983) suggested
that decentralising companies do so
in order to make use of the cheaper
labour in South Africa's homelands.
Further, that this move is forced upon
these companies by international com­
petition, as reflected in the inter­
national division of labour and the
move of labour intensive industries to
Third World countries. Bell's well sub­
stantiated research does not bring into
consideration:
(i) the sectoral composition of the
major industrial sectors which are
decentralising relative to import
protection. Since South African 
industry enjoys substantial im­
port protection, the onus is on 
Bell to demonstrate why the rele­
vant sectors are experiencing 'ex­
cessive' competition from im­
ports. 
(ii) the sectoral composition of de­
centralising industries appears to
· be weighted to capital intensive
industries, that is·, industries for
which labour costs are relatively
less significant than the costs of
capital. In this light, tax holidays
appear consequential.
(iii) the sudden increase in the number
of applicants and the potential
capital contribution coincides
with the announcement of the
new concessions. While the cur­
rent recession might create in­
creased competitive pressures, the
present scale of interest in de­
centralisation cannot support the
position of its being due simply
to such pressures.
2. Fixed assets, loans and investments 
include land and buildings, infra­
structure, machinery and equipment, 
office and sundry equipment, motor 
vehicles, sundry farming assets, good­
will and share investments at cost less 
amounts written off and depreciation.
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